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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN ENGLAND AND
THE UNITED STATES: COMPARISONS
IN INITIATING PROSECUTIONS
IRVING R. KAUFMAN*
THE legal institutions of Great Britain have long served as the
well-spring of American law. In drafting the Federal Constitution,
the framers embellished British conceptions of a government of sepa-
rated powers,' and drew on the enactments of Parliament. 2 For
many years after the Revolution, American courts sought rules of de-
cision in the English common law. 3 In the intervening decades,
American and English judges have not forgotten their common
heritage-frequently looking to the development of legal doctrine in
the other's country as fertile ground for comparative study. Over the
years, this spiritual and legal cousinage has been fostered by Anglo-
American Interchanges.
Since its inception in 1961, the Interchange periodicially has
gathered distinguished judges, practitioners, and academicians from
both sides of the Atlantic to compare the legal systems of England
and the United States. 4 The Interchanges stress practical observa-
tion, in the hope that efficient procedures of one country may be
adopted and utilized in the other. 5 The latest program in this series
* Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; Chief
Judge (1973-1980). District Court Judge (1949-1961) and Assistant United States At-
torney (1935-1940) in the Southern District of New York. Chairman of the Executive
Committee and former President of the Institute of Judicial Administration.
1. Kaufman, The Essence of Judicial Independence, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 671, 700
(1980).
2. For example, article III's two-witness rule in cases of treason, U.S. Const.
art. III, § 3, cl. 1, derives from Parliament's Statute of Treasons of 1695, 7 & 8 Will,
3, c. 3, § 2. Kentridge, The Pathology of a Legal System: Criminal Justice In South
Africa, 128 U. Pa. L. Rev. 603, 608 n.11 (1980).
3. Their search was not unquestioning, however. Before early American courts
would accept an English common law rule, they had to be satisfied it was consistent
with American life and custom. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Pullis (Philadelphia
Cordwiners Case, 1806), in III A Documentary History of American Industrial Soci-
ety 59 (1910).
4. For the past 20 years, the Institute of Judicial Administration has organ-
ized and sponsored the American half of the Interchanges. The British side enjoys
the official blessing of Her Majesty's Government, with the British Foreign and
Commonwealth Office providing much of the manpower and expertise to coordinate
the exchanges.
5. The first Interchange convinced some American courts, notably the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, to adopt the English practice of disposing of some
appellate cases from the bench. Karlen, Anglo-American Interchanges: An Approach
to the Comparative Study of Judicial Administration. 57 Judicature 342, 346 (1974).
26
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occurred during the summer of 1980, when an American team of
jurists travelled to Britain to study English criminal practice. The
program concluded in September with a return visit from the British.
On these occasions, Lord Diplock directed the English group, while
Chief Justice Warren Burger asked me to join him in leading the
American team. 6
Our firsthand observation of the British criminal justice system re-
vealed several major differences in the procedures used in the two
countries. Space constrictions permit citing only a few. For example,
grand juries have been eliminated in England. Instead, all prosecu-
tions are brought before a Magistrate, who takes evidence and de-
cides cases involving certain minor offenses and commits the more
serious matters for disposition in Crown Court.7  In addition, British
prosecuting counsel 8 may amend an indictment after the case is
committed 9-a practice that would violate the fifth amendment if at-
As a result of the fifth Exchange, the British team proposed that English appellate
courts abandon the custom of acquiring their knowledge of a case principally from
oral argument. They recommended instead that such courts follow the American
practice of reading documents in the case-the notice of appeal, the judgment ap-
pealed from, and pertinent parts of the transcript-in advance of argument. Kauf-
man, The Fifth Anglo-American Exchange: Some Observations, 61 judicature 327,
331 (1978).
6. In addition to Chief Justice Burger and Judge Kaufman, the American par-
ticipants were James E. S. Baker (then-President of the American College of Trial
Lawyers), William Bryson (Chief of the Justice Department's Criminal Division, Ap-
pellate Section), Justice Winslow Christian of the California Court of Appeals, George
J. Cotsirilos, Esq., Senator Howell T. Heflin of Alabama, Philip B. Heymann (Assist-
ant Attorney General, Criminal Division), Dean Howard Kalodner (Western New
England College School of Law), Judge Sandra D. O'Connor of the Arizona Court of
Appeals, Professor Kenneth F. Ripple (Notre Dame Law School), Chief Justice
Clement C. Torbert of the Alabama Supreme Court, Dean Ernst J. Watts (National
Judicial College), and William H. Webster (Director of the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation and former Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit). The British team, led by Lord Diplock, Lord of Appeal in Ordinary in the
House of Lords, included Lord Justice Watkins of the Court of Appeal, Judge
West-Russell of the Crown Court, Judge Walker of the Circuit Court, Sir Wilfrid
Bourne (Permanent Secretary to the Lord High Chancellor), D. R. Thompson (Regis-
trar and Master of the Crown Office), Peter D. Robinson (Circuit Administrator, S.
E.), and Richard DuCann, barrister.
7. See Address by Peter Goldstone, A.B.A. Section of Criminal Justice Seminar,
in London (Oct. 1976), reprinted in A.B.A., English Criminal Law and Procedure:
The Way a Briton Would Explain It to an American 37, 40-41 (1978). For a discus-
sion of the diminishing role of the Magistrate in certain criminal cases, see notes
68-71 infra and accompanying text.
8. This Article will follow the English practice of using the term "counsel" to
refer only to barristers, not solicitors. The role of British prosecuting counsel is dis-
cussed below. See notes 27-30 infra and accompanying text.
9. Address by John Leonard, A.B.A. Section of Criminal Justice Seminar, in
London (Oct. 1976), reprinted in A.B.A., English Criminal Law and Procedure: The
Way a Briton Would Explain It to an American 62, 70-71 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Leonard Speech].
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tempted in the United States, unless the case were resubmitted to a
grand jury.
The most striking dissimilarity between the English and American
criminal systems is their divergent methods of bringing prosecutions.
This Article will discuss one aspect of that difference: the method by
which prosecutors decide to commence actions against individuals
suspected of criminal activities. 10
I. THE MACHINERY OF THE PROSECUTION
The rules governing the institution of criminal proceedings in the
United States are well-known. All prosecutions are commenced by
prosecuting attorneys-officials who are independent of the courts
and police. The old common law principle that permitted private citi-
zens to bring their own criminal actions is extinct in this country.
In contrast to the procedural simplicity of the American system,
few rules are more complex or confusing than those governing the
initiation of English criminal proceedings." The British system is
founded on the notion of private prosecution. Thus, with some qual-
ifications,' 2 anyone in England can institute a criminal action against
an alleged offender.' 3 This does not mean, however, that the dock-
ets of the English courts are crowded with such prosecutions. On the
contrary, the average British citizen is usually content merely to re-
port a suspected criminal violation to the police and leave the matter
in their hands.
Cost is one explanation for a private individual's reluctance to pros-
ecute. The expense of bringing a prosecution in a serious case is sig-
nificant and presents a major economic hurdle to most private citizens
wishing to institute their own criminal proceedings. 14 Thus, it might
seem surprising that Parliament has thought it necessary to further
restrict an individual's exercise of this right. But, many statutes pro-
vide that before instituting a prosecution for a given offense, the
10. The legal system of England and Wales differs from those of Scotland and
Northern Ireland. Reference Division, British Information Services, The Legal Sys-
tems of Britain 1-2 (1976). Only English and Welsh criminal practice will be dis-
cussed here.
11. Cf. Criminal Justice Committee, The Prosecution Process in England and
Wales, 1970 Crim. L. Rev. 668, 668 [hereinafter cited as Prosecution Process] ("The
machinery for the initiation and conduct of prosecutions in England and Wales pre-
sents a surprisingly complex and confusing picture.").
12. See notes 15-19 infra and accompanying text.
13. P. Devlin, The Criminal Prosecution in England 20 (1958). Without disgress-
ing into the difficult English concept of locus standi, it suffices to note that the
private prosecutor need not have any special relationship to the victim.
14. See Prosecution Process, supra note 11, at 671.
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complainant must first obtain the consent of either the court 15 or a
governmental official 16 -frequently the Director of Public Prosecu-
tions. 17 It is difficult to discern a pattern to these -consent require-
ments because the offenses they cover vary greatly in severity. Some
commentators, however, suggest that these restrictions are intended
to increase uniformity in prosecuting policy and to minimize oppres-
sive or vexatious prosecutions. 18
Additional impediments on private prosecutions include the Direc-
tor's complete discretion to assume control of any criminal case and
the Attorney General's power to halt the prosecution of cases triable
on indictment 19 by entering a nolle prosequi. Finally, the private
prosecutor who brings a case maliciously may find himself liable for
civil damages to the defendant.
In spite of these limitations, the English view a private citizen's
right to bring a criminal proceeding as an important constitutional
backstop against abuse of prosecutorial discretion by public offi-
cials.2 0 In practice, however, private individuals exercise this right
in less serious circumstances. Most private prosecutions are for simple
assaults or shoplifting.21
The significance of the "private prosecution" should not be under-
estimated, however. The criminal proceedings instituted by the
police, which constitute the vast bulk of English criminal actions,
share several attributes of the prosecutions brought by private citi-
zens. Thus, many of the restrictions placed on private prosecutions
apply to those brought by the police.2 2 Unlike the private citizen,
15. See The Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, Part 11 of the Written
Evidence of the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis 83-84 (1978) (hereinafter
cited as Commissioner's Written Evidence].
16. See id. at 85-86.
17. See id. at 86-88. The office of the Director of Public Prosecutions %-ill be
discussed below. See notes 27-36 infra and accompanying text..
18. See, e.g., Address by Sir Norman Skelhorn, A.B.A. Section of Criminal Jus-
tice Seminar, in London (Oct. 1976), reprinted in A.B.A., English Criminal Law and
Procedure: The Way a Briton Would Explain It to an American 32, 34-35 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Skelhorn Speech].
19. An indictment may be drafted by Police Solicitors or court personnel. For
purposes of the different jurisdictions of the English criminal courts, offenses are
divided into three categories: (1) indictable offenses, (2) summary offenses, and (3)
offenses which are both indictable and summary. Indictable offenses, wlhich are the
most serious, are tried only in the Crown Court; summary offenses, which are rela-
tively minor, fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court. Offenses
in the third category may be adjudicated in either court. E. Friesen & I. Scott,
English Criminal Justice 29, 35-37, 49 (1976).
20. See Skelhorn Speech, supra note 18, at 33-34. But see Prosecution Process,
supra note 11, at 670-71.
21. Commissioner's Written Evidence, supra note 15, at 82, 93.
22. The police must obtain the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions or
of the Attorney General before prosecuting certain offenses, see, e.g., Protection of
19801
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however, a police constable wishing to take a criminal defendant to
court does not face the formidable barrier of cost. Police prosecutions
are publicly funded, and the police may refer difficult legal issues to
Police Solicitors, whose fees are paid from the public fisc. Further-
more, bringing criminal actions is an integral part of a policeman's
job. Consequently, one cannot equate police prosecutions with truly
"private" actions.23
The police in England exercise their discretion to prosecute in a
wide variety of criminal matters-from minor traffic offenses to cases
of murder. In almost all these instances, the police make the initial
decision to proceed against the defendant.2 4 In specific serious
cases, they are required to report to the Director of Public Prosecu-
tions 25 and, in other important or legally complex matters, they will
consult solicitors for advice. 26 But in both instances, the initial deci-
sion to take the suspect to court is made by the police. Accordingly,
in the'vast majority of criminal cases, no public official charged with
making an independent evaluation of the need to prosecute stands
between the police and the courts.
In the early nineteenth century, the British police played an even
larger role in criminal proceedings, actually conducting prosecutions
of individuals charged with serious offenses. Doubts concerning a
policeman's competence to handle such matters gave rise to proposals
for an independent prosecuting agency. In 1879, Parliament resolved
this problem "by the characteristic English solution of a half-measure,
.. . followed by a slow process of muddling through." 2 7 It created
the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions. This office, which
was reorganized in 1908, now has considerable authority to influence
the administration of English criminal justice. Professor Delmar Kar-
len has concisely summarized the Director's responsibilities:
He is required to prosecute any case punishable by death, and
any case where his participation is ordered by the Home Secretary.
He may prosecute, if he sees fit to do so, any case referred to him
Children Act, 1978, c. 37, § 1(3); Criminal Law Act, 1977, c. 45, § 4(1); Bail Act,
1976, c. 63, § 9(5), and they may have to relinquish control over certain prosecutions
to the Director. Skelhorn Speech, supra note 18, at 34.
23. See Williams, The Power to Prosecute, 1955 Crim. L. Rev. 596, 603. Indeed,
the Criminal Justice Committee saw enough of a distinction between police prosecu-
tions and those brought by private citizens to recommend retaining the private indi-
vidual's right to prosecute, while urging that the majority of prosecutions now
brought by the police be handled by an independent public official. See Prosecution
Process, supra note 11, at 680-81.
24. In exceptional cases-when someone suspected of a serious offense is not
likely to attempt an escape-the Director of Public Prosecutions may make the ini-
tial decision to prosecute. Commissioner's Written Evidence, supra note 15, at 26.
25. The Prosecution of Offences Regulations, 1978 No. 1357 (L.33) § 6, 1978 Stat.
Inst. 4111-12.
26. See Commissioner's Written Evidence, supra note 15, at 18.
27. Williams, supra note 23, at 601-02.
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by any other government department. He may also prosecute an,
case that appears to him to be of such importance or difficulty that
his intervention seems necessary .... There is a substantial list of
offences which the police are required to report to the Director, so
that he can decide whether or not to undertake prosecution from
the outset, including ...sedition, espionage, misconduct by pub-
lic officials, counterfeiting, and most offences of an especially seri-
ous nature .... Finally, the director may, on request, give advice
on the conduct of a case to any private or official prosecutor, and
he may authorize any of them to incur special costs-as for scien-
tific evidence-to be paid out of public funds.28
In addition, many statutes require the Director's consent as a neces-
sary precondition to private prosecutions for certain offenses. Failure
to satisfy this requirement nullifies the proceedings. 29
Whenever the Director assumes control of a case, the prosecution
is conducted by so-called Treasury Counsel in the Inner London
Crown Court, the Old Bailey. These counsel are not public officials,
but distinguished barristers who take the Director's cases for fees
paid out of public funds. Although the Director has first call on their
services, they are allowed to take other work, including the defense
of criminal cases.3 0  Nevertheless, Treasury Counsel are the closest
English equivalents to American government prosecutors.
II. THE EXERCISE OF
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
Neither English nor American statutes significantly restrict the na-
tional government's discretion to proceed against a defendant. Except
for defining the parameters of criminal conduct, Congress has not
sought to intrude on the Justice Department's power to prosecute.
Similarly, the statutes creating the Director's office 3 l and the regula-
tions promulgated by the British Attorney General 32 do not confine
the Director's prosecutorial discretion.
28. D. Karlen, Anglo-American Criminal Justice 22-23 (1967). See also The Pros-
ecution of Offences Regulations, 1978 No. 1357 (L.33), 1978 Stat. Inst. 4111-12.
29. Moreover, if the clerk of the court has "some ground for suspecting" that a
prosecution has been withdrawn or delayed for no satisfactory reason, he must report
his suspicion to the Director. The Prosecution of Offences Regulations, 1978 No.
1357 (L.33) § 9, 1978 Stat. Inst. 4112.
30. Leonard Speech, supra note 9, at 62. Treasury Counsel are also briefed on
cases by the Department of Solicitors of the Metropolitan Police Force. Id. at 63.
31. Prosecution of Offences Act, 1908, 8 Edw. 7, c. 3; Prosecution of Offences
Act, 1884, 47 & 48 Vict., c. 58; Prosecution of Offences Act, 1879, 42 & 43 Vict., c.
22.
32. Prosecution of Offences Regulations, 1978 No. 1357 (L.33), 1978 Stat. Inst.
4111-12.
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In exercising his discretion, the Director is completely free from
political influence. Although appointed by and responsible to the At-
torney General, who holds government office, the Director maintains
his political independence. His ability to do so is explained by Sir
Norman Skelhorn, a former Director.
[T]here is a dichotomy in [the Attorney General's] functions, and
that part of his functions which consists of the overall control of the
enforcement of the criminal law . . . is quite distinct from the
political field. It is essentially a quasijudicial function and he is
subject to direction from no one ... as to the bringing or not
bringing of criminal proceedings in any particular case.
[The Director], likewise, [is] equally independent and [is] sub-
ject to directions from no one, save for the Attorney-General in
that limited field. 33
More neutral commentators also attest to the Director's political
isolation 3 4-as do recent events. In 1978, when a Labour govern-
ment clung to power only through a fragile coalition with the Liber-
als, the Director prosecuted Jeremy Thorpe, a prominent member of
the Liberal Party, for conspiracy to murder a man claiming once to
have been his homosexual lover. 35 Although Thorpe ultimately was
acquitted, the political ramifications of these proceedings were con-
siderable. 36
Former Attorney General Griffin Bell articulated well the uncertain
position of the federal government's leading prosecutor. After review-
ing the historical relationship between his office and that of the Pres-
ident, he concluded that "the independence of the Attorney General
has only a general and uneven tradition to support it . . . . "37 Many
commentators agree and have proposed insulating the head of the
Justice Department from Executive influence. 38 Indeed, during his
1976 campaign, President Carter suggested that the Attorney General
be appointed for a term of five to seven years.3 9 The "Saturday-
Night Massacre," 40 however, and recent actions by the Justice De-
33. Skelhorn Speech, supra note 18, at 32.
34. See, e.g., Sigler, Public Prosecution in England and Wales, 1974 Grim. L.
Rev. 642, 647.
35. See N.Y. Times, June 23, 1979, at 1, col. 2; id., May 23, 1979, § A, at 8, col.
3; id., May 9, 1979, § A, at 3, col. 2.
36. See N.Y. Times, June 23, 1979, at 1, col. 2; id., May 23, 1979, § A, at 8, col.
3; id., May 9, 1979, § A, at 3, col. 2.
37. Bell, The Attorney General: The Federal Government's Chief Lavyer and
Chief Litigator, Or One Among Many?, 46 Fordham L. Rev. 1049, 1068 (1978).
38. See, e.g., Rogovin, Reorganizing Politics Out of the Department of Justice, 64
A.B.A.J. 855, (1978).
39. Bell, supra note 37, at 1065.
40. On October 20, 1973, President Nixon ordered Attorney General Elliot
Richardson to dismiss Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox for refusing to limit his in-
vestigation of Nixon's involvement in the Watergate scandal. Richardson resigned
rather than comply with the President's request, and Deputy Attorney General Wil-
[Vol. 49
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partment have been interpreted by the media to indicate that the
Department is not entirely insulated from the appearance of political
pressures.
Thus far, I have drawn a comparison between the prosecutorial dis-
cretion of the United States Attorney General and that of the British
Director of Public Prosecutions. But, comparing tie Attorney Gener-
al's liberty of action to that of London's Commissioner of the Met-
ropolitan Police may be more fruitful. Despite his influence, the Di-
rector conducts only five to ten percent of the prosecutions brought
on indictment in England and Wales. 41 The Metropolitan Force,
however, brings a greater number of proceedings, involving a wider
spectrum of criminal offenses.4 2 The Metropolitan Police, which in-
cludes Scotland Yard, is the largest of England's forty-three police
units, employing over one-fifth of the country's police officers.4 3  Al-
though English police departments are largely under local control,
the Metropolitan Police, because of its size and expertise, exerts con-
siderable influence over national prosecuting policy.
Both the Metropolitan Police and the United States Attorney Gen-
eral exercise their discretion to prosecute free of signficant judicial
control. In the leading English case on this point, R. v. Metropolitan
Police Commissioner ex parte Blackburn,44 Lord Denning stated:
Although the chief officers of police are answerable to the law,
there are many fields in which they have a discretion with which
the law vwill not interfere. For instance, it is for the Commissioner
of Police, or the chief constable, as the case may be, to decide in
any particular case whether enquiries should be pursued, or
whether an arrest should be made, or a prosecution brought.45
Similarly, the United States courts have repeatedly agreed that a
prosecuting attorney has broad discretion either to institute or to
forego proceedings.46  In Smith v. United States,47 for example, the
liam Ruckelshaus was discharged when he failed to heed Nixon's order. Acting Attor-
ney General Robert Bork eventually acceded to the President's demands. Saturday-
Night Survivors, Newsweek, Oct. 20, 1975, at 14.
41. Reference Division, British Information Services, supra note 10, at 22.
42. See notes 24-25 supra and accompanying text.
43. E. Friesen & I. Scott, supra note 19, at 102.
44. [1968] 1 All E.R. 763 (C.A.).
45. Id. at 769. Lord Denning continued: "[Blut there are some policy decisions
with which, I think, the courts ... can, if necessary, interfere. Suppose a chief
constable were to issue a directive to his men that no person should be prosecuted
for stealing any goods less than £ 100 in value. I should have thought that the court
could countermand it. He would be failing in his duty to enforce the law." Id.;
see Williams, The Police and Law Enforcement, 1968 Grim. L. Rev. 351, 357-58 &
n.45.
46. See, e~g., Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 454-56 (1962) (a prosecutor's "con-
scious exercise of some selectivity" does not violate constitutional rights). United
States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115, 125 n.14 (5th Cir.) (the Attorney
1980]
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Fifth Circuit held: "The discretion of the Attorney General in choos-
ing whether to prosecute or not to prosecute, or to abandon a pro-
secution already started, is absolute." 48
Internal guidelines promulgated by the two institutions articulate
more significant checks on their freedom of choice. The criteria for
prosecution followed by the Metropolitan Police are contained in the
Commissioner's Written Evidence to the Royal Commission on Crim-
inal Procedure. 49  According to the Commissioner, once the police
decide sufficient credible evidence exists to justify a prosecution, 50
they look to several considerations in determining whether to take
the suspect to court: the age and health of the offender, the severity
of an offense, its prevalence in a particular comniunity, the punish-
ment likely to be imposed, and, for trivial violations, the possibility of
issuing a caution instead of resorting to criminal proceedings. 51 In
addition, they take account of the victim's and the public's views con-
cerning prosecution. 52
The Justice Department's newly-issued Principles of Federal Pros-
ecution (Federal Principles) 53 are both more detailed and express the
Department's greater willingness to weigh difficult matters of culpa-
bility and deterrence, rather than leave those issues solely to the
courts. In addition to the factors considered by the Metropolitan
Police, the Federal Principles direct the prosecutor's attention to fed-
eral law enforcement priorities, the deterrent effect of prosecution,
the suspect's culpability in connection with the offense, his history
with respect to criminal activity, his willingness to cooperate in the
prosecution of others, the possibility of prosecution in another juris-
diction, and the availability of noncriminal dispositions. 54  The Fed-
eral Principles go on to state that a government attorney is not to
General's wide discretion in the exercise of the prosecutorial function in civil cases
comparable to his discretion in criminal cases), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 826 (1973).
47. 375 F.2d 243 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 841 (1967).
48. Id. at 247 (emphasis added); accord Weisberg v. United States Dep't of Jus-
tice, 489 F.2d 1195, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("The Attorney General's prosecutorial
discretion is broad, indeed, and ordinarily at least, is not subject to judicial review."),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974).
49. See Commissioner's Written Evidence, supra note 15, at 1-15.
50. Id. at 1-3.
51. Id. at 6-14. Verbal and written cautions are noncriminal dispositions that the
police usually reserve for trivial offenses. Id. at 12.
52. Id. at 9-10.
53. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Principles of Federal Prosecution (1980). "The princi-
ples set forth herein, and internal office procedures adopted pursuant hereto, are
intended solely for the guidance of attorneys for the government. They are not in-
tended to, do not, and may not be relied upon to create a right or benefit, substan-
tive or procedural, enforceable at law by a party to litigation with the United States."
Id. Part A, 5.
54. Id. Part B, 2(b),(c), 3(a),(c),(d),(e),(t).
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consider the person's race, religion, sex, national origin, or political
beliefs in deciding to institute criminal proceedings. 55
An English police solicitor would probably have little difficulty in
accepting many of the Justice Department's guidelines. Thus, the
Police Commissioner's Written Evidence contains no suggestion that
his force bases its decisions on a suspect's race dr sex. And, the Com-
missioner's failure to list the suspect's prior criminal history among his
criteria may be explained by the English practice of "taking offences
into consideration" in sentencing.56
Some of the distinctions between the two sets of guidelines, how-
ever, may reflect basic disagreements over a prosecutor's proper rela-
tionship with the courts. In defending the Metropolitan Police's re-
fusal to consider noncriminal dispositions in all but trivial cases, the
Commissioner stated: "[T]he seriousness or trivialitv of an offence is
a subject more fit for consideration by a Court rather than a
nonjudicial individual whether he be a police officer or an official
prosecutor." 57  In contrast, the Federal Principles authorize a gov-
ernment attorney to contemplate noncriminal dispositions even in
".response to serious forms of antisocial activity'." 58  In light of this
difference, an English policeman would doubtlessly disagree that
the "deterrent effect of prosecution" 59 or the suspect's "culpability in
connection with the offense"6r0 are subjects he should consider in
deciding whether to prosecute. He would pass that responsibility to
the judge for consideration on disposition.
III. Do THE ENGLISH OVER-PROSECUTE?
In deciding whether to institute criminal proceedings, a prosecutor
must balance two competing responsibilities. He must vigorously
55. Id. Part B, 6(a). Paragraph 6 commendably provides that the government at-
torney's decision to prosecute should not be influenced by his personal feelings con-
cerning the suspect, the suspect's associates, or the victim, nor should lie be guided
by the possible effect of his decision on his own professional or personal cir-
cumstances. Id. Part B, 6(b),(c).
56. The police may advise the sentencing judge that they suspect a convicted
defendant of other, as yet unproven, offenses. The judge may then take these of-
fenses into account in passing sentence, although lie may not exceed the statutory
maximum for the crime of which the defendant stands convicted. Individuals who
have had their sentences increased in this way cannot plead autrefois courict if they
are subsequently prosecuted on the additional charges, but the police rarely seek
such convictions.
57. Commissioner's Written Evidence. supra note 15. at 14.
58. U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 53, Part B. ' 5, Comment at 13. "Examples
of such non-criminal approaches include civil tax proceedings; civil actions under the
securities, customs, antitrust, or other regulatory laws; and refereice of complaints to
licensing authorities or to professional organizations such as bar associations.' Id.
59. Id. Part B, 3(c).
60. Id. Part B, 3(d).
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prosecute individuals reasonably suspected of significant criminal ac-
tivity, but must avoid harassing or disturbing innocent citizens. InI
weighing these factors, he is obligated to look beyond the immediate
problem of winning a case and consider instead the fair and efficient
administration of criminal justice.
A prosecutor's decision becomes more onerous if he weighs the
serious costs of bringing unnecessary or unfounded criminal actions.
Such prosecutions not only waste valuable judicial time and
resources-and contribute to backlogs in the criminal courts-but
they may bring public disgrace upon the innocent. Even a sub-
sequent acquittal may do little to resurrect an accused's personal
fortunes-or his faith in the law.
It is important to ask, therefore, whether the English and Ameri-
can prosecutorial systems are equally adept at screening out needless
or ill-founded cases. Do the two systems produce comparable results?
Or does one do a better job of prosecuting the guilty and leaving the
innocent alone?
Comparisons of this kind are especially hazardous because acquittal
rates 61 in criminal cases may be affected by several dissimilarities
between English and American criminal practice. To cite one example,
significant differences exist in the systems of jury selection used in
the two countries. English juries in criminal cases are selected
quickly. Defense objections are rare, and objections by the Crown
are practically unknown. In contrast, potential jurors in the United
States may be questioned extensively, and in highly publicized cases,
both sides will carefully scrutinize a juror's predispositions toward the
accused. Challenges to the racial composition of a jury are also com-
mon in the United States.
In spite of these differences, however, my observations of British
criminal proceedings convince me that the English police do press a
significant number of weak prosecutions. Two examples came to my
attention while I participated in the Anglo-American Interchange. In
the first, a newspaper deliverer, who carried a knife to cut the twine
on bundles of papers, found himself in a scuffle. The police arrested
him, discovered the knife, and prosecuted him simply for carrying it,
although it was conceded that his occupation required its use. The
second example involved a prosecution for possession of five milli-
grams of cannabis resin-an amount equal to five grains of salt. This
case eventually reached the Court of Appeal, where Mr. Justice Wien
reversed the defendant's conviction, declaring it "offensive that the
whole machinery of law should be brought into operation" 6 2 over this
insignificant violation.
61. In this context, the acquittal rate equals the frequency with which defendants
who plead not guilty are exonerated-either because the trier of fact finds them
innocent, or because the court dismisses the case.
62. Daily Telegraph (London), July 18, 1980, at 3, col. 6.
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British commentators confirm my observations. John Leonard,
Former Chairman of the English Criminal Bar Association, reports
that it is not unusual for prosecuting counsel to get cases lacking suf-
ficient evidentiary support. "[Getting a bad case] is not theory; it
happens in practice. It has happened to me a number of times, and it
is much more likely to happen nowadays than it used to." 63  Simi-
larly, Friesen and Scott, writing for the British Institute of Judicial
Administration, state: "In recent times concern has been expressed
that far too many 'weak' cases are committed for trial in the Crown
Court ..... 64
A complete explanation for the frequency of weak English pros-
ecutions cannot rest in the differences between the prosecution
guidelines of the Metropolitan Police and those of the Justice De-
partment. As previously discussed, 65 these two sets of principles do
not differ significantly, although the English criteria do show a
greater willingness to pass borderline cases on to the courts. It is thus
unlikely that changing those guidelines will effectively reduce the
number of ill-founded British prosecutions.
A more plausible explanation for the incidence of deficient cases in
the Crown Courts is that the English police make the decision to
institute criminal proceedings. The 1970 Report by the Criminal Jus-
tice Committee 66 summarized the consequences of this form of de-
cisionmaking:
The honest, zealous and conscientious police officer who has
satisfied himself that the suspect is guilty becomes psychologically
committed to prosecution and thus to successful prosecution ...
As Sir Alexander Cockburn [who served as Attorney General in
1856] put it ... when the police "mix themselves up in the con-
duct of a prosecution ... they acquire a bias infinitely stronger
than that which must under any circumstances naturally attach it-
self to their evidence." In consequence, a senior police officer may
be inhibited in refusing to prosecute in order not to damage police
morale--whereas an independent prosecutor would not be influ-
enced by such considerations.
63. Leonard Speech, supra note 9, at 64. See Address by Derek Hodgson,
A.B.A. Section of Criminal Justice Seminar, in Londdn (Oct. 1976), reprinted in
A.B.A., English Criminal Law and Procedure; The Way a Briton Would Explain It to
an American, 101, 105-10 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Hodgson Speech]. But see
Commissioner's Written Evidence, supra note 15, at 24, 33; Bowley.
Prosecution-A Matter for the Police, 1975 Crim. L. Rev. 442. Leonard attributes
the recent increase in "weak" prosecutions to the practice of "paper committal."
Leonard Speech, supra note 9, at 65. See notes 68-70 infra and accompanying text.
64. E. Friesen & I. Scott, supra note 19, at 56.
65. See notes 49-60 supra and accompanying text.
66. Prosecution Process, supra note 11. The Criminal Justice Committee %'as
formed by the Council of Justice, which subsequently endorsed the Committee's re-
port. Id. at 683.
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The police are ill-equipped by outlook, training and function to
weigh [factors militating against a prosecution] objectively .... At
the present time there are very considerable regional variations in
prosecuting policy regarding certain types of offence-owing to the
differing attitudes of individual chief constables .... [T]he risk of
prosecution ought not to depend on this kind of chance.67
The unfortunate consequences of police over-prosecution have been
exacerbated in recent years by a change in the procedure for commit-
ting cases to Crown Court. Formerly, all of the more serious criminal
proceedings were screened by Magistrates, who scrutinized the pros-
ecution's evidence before sending on the case. In 1967, however, Par-
liament authorized the process of "paper committal," whereby defend-
ants could agree to bypass the full-blown committal process. 8 In the
substitute proceedings, Magistrates rarely even glance at the prosecu-
tion's cases. 69 This change is significant, for in the English criminal
justice system, the Magistrate is the first government official who
makes an independent evaluation of the police officer's decision to
prosecute. In spite of the reduced pre-trial screening in "paper com-
mittal," most defendants select this option. 70 Their reasons for doing
so are practical; this procedure speeds disposition of their cases and
saves money on lawyers' fees. What this procedure conserves in de-
fendants' out-of-pocket expenses, however, may be more than offset
by the increased human and social costs produced when individuals
are needlessly forced to defend themselves in court.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the United States, the prosecutor bridges the gap between the
police and the courts by exercising his independent judgment con-
cerning the need to institute criminal proceedings in a particular
case. His role is crucial to the fair administration of justice, for an
ill-founded decision to prosecute can be disasterous -both for the ac-
cused and for the criminal justice system. His independence from
governmental investigative agencies contributes to the impartial dis-
charge of a prosecutor's responsibilities. In England, however, the
police make the decision to prosecute in virtually all criminal cases.
Without disparaging the dedication of British policemen, one must
concede that their involvement in criminal investigations prevents
67. Id. at 672-73; see Sigler, Public Prosecution in England and Wales, 1974
Crim. L. Rev. 642, 645 ("My own interviews with prosecuting officials tend to show
great variation in prosecution policies from place to place, depending very largely
upon the independent views of the chief constables.").
68. Criminal Justice Act, 1967, c. 80, § 1.
69. See Hodgson Speech, supra note 63, at 105.
70. Id. at 105-06; Leonard Speech, supra note 9, at 65.
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their objective assessment of the many considerations for and against
instituting criminal actions.
Admittedly, the American prosecutorial system may not provide
the perfect model for the English. Adopting the Scottish system of
the Procurator Fiscal, 71 or expanding the duties of the Director of
Public Prosecutions are alternatives worth exploring. My experiences
as a participant in the Anglo-American Interchange, however, suggest
that the British police should carry a smaller share of the burden in
deciding to prosecute criminal suspects.
71. See Reference Division, British Information Services. supra note 10. at 5.5.
See also Prosecution Process, supra note 11. at 676-79.
